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We should meet the centaur and the dragon, and then perhaps suddenly 
behold . . . sheep, and dogs, and horses—and wolves . . . 
—J. R. R. Tolkien
WHATEVER THE MEDIUM, FANTASTIC NARRATIVES NOW DOMINATE VAST 
areas of the popular imagination. So entrenched that it has become “a default 
cultural vernacular” (Miéville, “Editorial” 40), fantasy cannot be overlooked. 
The popularity of Harry Potter, The Lord of the Rings, and A Game of Thrones 
indicates that the genre is a pervasive phenomenon, demanding critical 
evaluation of its emotional appeal and its political implications. Fantasy’s 
increasing presence in the marketplace, together with the genre’s potential 
for progressive socio-political representation, indicates the genre’s aesthetic 
power. Indeed, as a communicative method, fantasy’s ever-widening audience 
implies an increasing burden on the genre. We, as writers, readers, academics, 
must ask and continue to ask: what is fantasy communicating? What are its 
discursive objectives? Why should I read fantasy? 
 Kathryn Hume argues that realism “no longer imparts an adequate sense 
of meaning to our experience with reality” (39), that the realist strategy does 
not, and cannot, fully engage the reader. By going past reality, by plunging 
through and beyond it, fantasy can offer an interesting, at times disturbing, 
perspective. As Mark Bould suggests: “Marxist theories of fantasy and the 
fantastic offer an opportunity not only to engage with extremely popular areas 
of cultural production but also to better model the subject for political praxis” 
(53). Be that as it may, Bould is vague on how fantasy best shapes the indi-
vidual subject for political praxis. Before continuing, this fundamental position 
must be unpacked; political praxis and progressive potential carry heavy, ideologi-
cal baggage. Quite rightly: the concepts are linked. The progressive potential 
of fantasy can direct the subject (reader) towards a new, radical, (perhaps) 
emancipated subjectivity. Only after this process is complete will political 
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Abstract
This article connects Pullman’s His Dark Materials with two previous materi-
alist epics, Lucretius’s On the Nature of Things (de rerum natura) and Milton’s 
Paradise Lost. Like Lucretius and Milton, Pullman creates a world in which 
there is no spirit separate from matter, and in which all creatures, including 
angels and the dead, are material beings. Like Lucretius, Pullman attacks the 
idea of a life after death: the long journey through the underworld in The 
Amber Spyglass presents idea of an afterlife as unnatural, a hindering of the 
natural tendency of atoms making up the dead to rejoin the rest of the uni-
verse. One of the traditional functions of epic is theodicy—a defense of divine 
justice. Like Lucretius’s poem, His Dark Materials substitutes for this defense 
a defense of life lived fully in the world. He suggests further that immortality 
is a function of the stories that we live—and tell.
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praxis—action engendering changes to the dominant capitalist gestalt—be 
able to develop. By affirming fantasy as a site that can potentially (re)direct 
political praxis, Bould alerts readers to the exciting possibility of a social role 
for fantasy. However, certain epistemological biases must be made clear. 
 Brian Attebery sums up the problem succinctly in “The Politics (If Any) 
of Fantasy” when he discusses the nature of fantasy’s most obvious impos-
sibility: anachronism. He says: “But the more important function—dare I say 
political function—of creative anachronism occurs when you take a little bit 
of the Middle Ages and plop it down in the midst of freeways and shopping 
malls. The contrast, the disjunction, transforms the present” (15–16). The 
basic instance of disjunction, the novum of dislocation (if this is possible) is 
neutral. Transforming the present does not suggest transformation for the bet-
ter or for the worse. We can argue that any transformation is political but it is 
apolitical or, to put it another way, its political cloth has yet to be dyed. The 
transformative aspect of anachronistic disjunction is an aesthetic tool and its 
uses can be many. While Bould and Jameson may want the fantastic to deliver 
revolutionary or progressive responses, there is nothing intrinsic to fantasy or 
sf that forces them into Marxist representations. When this article explores 
fantasy’s progressive potential, it is with the full knowledge that the genre does 
not skew in that direction traditionally. Indeed, the writers later discussed are 
not to be taken as wholly progressive fantasists; indeed, Gene Wolfe’s Book 
of the New Sun, with its reworked Christianity, carries distinctly conservative 
notions regarding the role of the state, the nature of sacrifice, and the function 
of suffering in society. The ability to write the strange, the impossible, and the 
unreal is a means to many ends. 
 Miéville asserts that to “claim that fantasy is in some systematic way 
resistant to ideology or rebellious against authority is, and anyone who knows 
the genre can attest, laugh-out-loud funny” (“Cognition” 242). The comment 
recalls a long tradition of reactionary fantasy. Tackling arguably the best-
known fantasist, J. R. R. Tolkien, it is possible to see how fantasy can be seen 
as an “escape” from reality, thus affirming dominant ideology. Historically, 
the great majority of genre fantasy, those “sword-and-sorcery,” multi-volume 
series and mass-marketed franchise fiction, have been ciphers of Marcuse’s 
“affirmative culture” at best, blatantly nationalistic at worst.
 Suvin asks, “why should Tolkien or the Conan stories or the frenziedly rac-
ist Lovecraft not be legitimately usable by neo-fascism” (“Considering” 236)? 
It is a valid and important question that should always be repeated by those 
exploring (and writing) fantasy. Fantasy (and sf) can be used, and used dif-
ferently in different cultures: literature will always be contextually framed. In 
the West, the vast majority of fantasy, those multi-volume mega-series, have 
been reflections, if not products of conservative politics. This article argues 
the need for a progressive change and takes up the sentiment of Miéville’s 
challenge: “No matter how commodified and domesticated the fantastic in its 
various forms might be, we need fantasy to think the world, and to change it” 
(“Editorial” 48).
 Terms like “progressive” and “utopia” are fundamental markers of Marx-
ist thought. This is not to suggest that they are exclusively Marxist (there are 
capitalist, fascist, even anarchic utopias), but that the basic idea of “bettering,” 
that we should progress towards an existence with as little repression possible, 
has historically been assigned to humanist-socialist positions. Hume would call 
this “vision,” a vision that “aims to disturb us by dislodging us from our settled 
sense of reality, and tries to engage our emotions on behalf of this new version 
of the real” (56). The point is valid. Not only is the engine used to drive praxis 
identified as (fundamentally) emotional, but the aesthetic goal is not to leave 
the subject “unsettled”: rather the goal is to create a “new version of the real.” 
By the simple act of constructing a “disturbing,” “weird,” “impossible” world, 
fantasy turns “real” into a category—a category that can be opened to radical, 
progressive change.
 In Fantasy and Mimesis, Hume expends much thought not only on what 
Tolkien wrote but what he wrote about his genre. In The Lord of the Rings, 
Tolkien realized a vision of a world beyond (or behind) the mechanized, war-
torn reality he knew. Though his stance is “much closer to ‘wouldn’t it be nice 
if this were true’ or ‘I would rather find this true than what I see everyday’” 
(Hume 47), his medieval, honor-bound, deathless Middle-earth is not there-
fore less utopian, but a specifically nostalgic, golden-age, and reactionary uto-
pian form. It becomes dangerously naive. The impulse behind it becomes not 
so much a desire to create a “better” world but to escape into a pre-industrial 
landscape: it turns aside from the deep-rooted structural problems of post-
global conflict modernity in favor of the perceived simplicity of pastoral Hob-
biton, colonial Gondor, and immortal Valinor. This impulse is reactionary and 
therefore problematic. As the progenitor of “sword-and-sorcery,” Tolkien set 
the great majority of the genre on a seductive path, a path to the status quo. 
Hume says of Tolkien imitators: 
Trashy though many adventures are, they encourage belief in the possibility 
of meaningful action. They deny that the individual is worthless, a negligible 
statistic. Even at the lowest valuation, this reassurance has psychological 
value, for people who cannot believe in themselves have trouble engaging 
themselves with life in any fashion. (68)
The problem in this case is that “meaningful action” in an affirmative fantasy 
invariably correlates with self-sacrifice, xenophobia, and some form of nation-
alism. The individual derives worth by “pulling his/her” weight, sublimating 
individuality in the name of liberty, freedom, or a nebulous “good.” The status 
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quo is maintained because the reader feels no need to change as “evil” has 
been vicariously defeated by the text’s hero and the need for social change 
effaced by nostalgic recollection. This is a tenet of affirmative literature; it 
“lulls and flatters the reader rather than challenging and contradicting them” 
(Hume 84), assuring that dominant ideology is reinforced. This is a form of 
stagnation and a function that fantasy needs to shed. 
 Opposed to Tolkien’s conservative use of the past, progressive fantasy can 
use the genre’s ubiquitous temporal dislocations to expose how history informs 
the present and the future, rupturing reality to re-imagine the then for the 
benefit of the now and the nows yet to pass. In this light, the concept of “pro-
gressive potential” suggests a direction the genre can and should take. Using 
China Miéville’s Perdido Street Station, Gene Wolfe’s Shadow of the Torturer, 
and Samuel Delany’s Tales of Nevèrÿon as examples, this article will argue 
how fantasy can take up that direction. Importantly, these three texts, from 
the wide range of fantasy in the market, are framed by an intrinsic political 
concern: the ways in which fantasy can represent, interrogate, and alter real-
ity. Taking up the past and the future, this article will highlight how these two 
categories are intertwined, how one influences the other, and how a fantastic 
interruption of history can radically alter the reader’s understanding of the 
then, the now, and after.  
 Recalling Attebery’s understanding of the power of creative anachronism, 
fantasy’s access to the past, its creation of secondary worlds bubbling with a 
melange of past culture, practice, peoples, and ideas is extremely important. 
Of course, we must remember that anachronism is not in itself progressive: it 
is a single tool in fantasy’s aesthetic arsenal. However, the ability to re-write 
and re-cover history is something fantasy can and should attempt, though it 
must be done with care. We see and hear history’s traces, its echoes, but as it 
speaks to us, we cannot truly understand its voice or comprehend its face, nor 
can we completely reach back to grasp the past. Tolkien’s escape to the Middle 
Ages becomes not so much a reach to bring back some truth but a retreat 
from the true struggles of his extra-textual world. Attebery speaks to the chal-
lenge of unearthing what must not be lost: “Texts from the past no longer 
speak to us as they spoke to their original audiences, but they still lurk in our 
libraries, challenging us to provide them with new voices and new meanings” 
(“Politics” 16). New voices and meanings seem to be, regardless of political 
frames, something intrinsic to a genre bulging with the impossible. Attebery 
suggests taking the past and inscribing old and forgotten voices with a fresh 
perspective. Considering that the present (and future) are inexorably dictated 
to by the past, should we not return there if we find fault with present reality? 
In Attebery’s idea is a revolutionary desire to reclaim history and give it the 
ability to speak to us, here and now. What might it say? What might it think 
of historical progress? Perhaps there has been no progress—and what is more 
frightening and dissatisfying than that?
 Dissatisfaction is a perfect starting point for fantastic incisions into real-
ity. Fredric Jameson’s introduction to Archaeologies of the Future is encased 
by dissatisfaction with the modern, hegemonic, capitalist state. Conceivably, 
the “fantastic narrative,” a narrative defined (no matter its science fiction 
or fantasy label) by its impossibility, is best suited to “open up,” “uncover,” 
or “reimagine” the places of desire that are often ignored and/or repressed. 
Furthermore, the fantastic’s representation of the impossible or unreal logi-
cally brings the discussion to utopia as a site of ideological interrogation. The 
fantastic’s preoccupation with the impossible, with expressing the “dark areas” 
of reality, can be defined as that which is impossible within the author’s social 
totality. In other words, socialist utopia is impossible, is unnecessary and ideo-
logically repulsive, because capitalism has already provided its own gratifying 
ideal, its own utopian consumerism: you can buy whatever you want, whatever 
it is you need.  
 In Marxist Aesthetics, Pauline Johnson states that the fundamental func-
tion of Marxist aesthetic theories is to “give an enlightening capacity to art” 
(1). This Lukácsian position suggests that an artwork should not only map the 
“daily life” of capitalist reality, but emancipate the individual’s consciousness 
from that daily life. Johnson’s reading provides a perspective from which to 
judge Jameson’s utopian aesthetic, which consists of recognition, demystifica-
tion, exhaustion, and (possibly) re-creation.1 At a basic level, Jameson builds 
on the model of cognition used by Lukács: the artistic text (in Lukács’s case, 
realism) is a complete map of society that necessarily includes that society’s 
dominant subjectivity and the “gaps” this subjectivity creates. This utopian 
aesthetic is concerned with the illumination, then exhaustion of dominant 
ideology.2 In other words, literature does not simply illustrate the subject’s 
everyday social existence as “bad” or “corrupt,” but enters into dialogue with 
the subject’s “everyday thinking.” This dialectic demonstrates the falsity of 
such thinking or, more to the point, demonstrates how such thinking is a 
product of capitalism’s fetishization of daily life. 
 We should note that this “cognitive” function, as the basis for his utopian 
aesthetic, is the basis for Jameson’s selection of sf as the exemplary fantas-
tic medium. The determinant in this case, the factor that separates sf from 
fantasy, can loosely be called extrapolation. Sf is sympathetic with realism 
(Lukács’s seminal aesthetic) because it projects the ideological content of a 
“now” into a “future”; it cognitively maps the social totality, extrapolating it 
to a logical end. 
 Are we, as Hume suggests, “only dully aware of everyday life” (84)? 
Jameson follows Althusser’s claim that by making visible the architecture of 
ideological superstructures, by tracing the social totality they construct, the 
actualities they deny, repress, or efface, literary portrayal can demystify and 
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deconstruct. Necessarily, the underlying focus of the utopian aesthetic is 
predicated on the idea of making visible dominant subjectivity, “making us 
more aware of our mental and ideological imprisonment” (Archaeologies xiii). 
Inherently then, the extrapolation of ideology to its logical terminus is directed 
toward the de-alienation or “freeing” of the individual subject. Utopian 
representation, predominantly dystopian in Jameson’s sf canon,3 illustrates 
the depredations and deprivations of Western modernity, illuminating their 
“invisible” workings. This is the source of sf’s connation with a warning: do 
something about your present to avoid this future. This is the goal of the Marx-
ist aesthetic: to represent reality as it truly is, cutting through the perception 
of “daily life” to shock the subject, and open them up to the potential of a new 
subjectivity. For it is only by defamiliarizing readers from their preconceptions 
of what is real and possible that new realties and possibilities can deck their 
thoughts. 
 Logically, Jameson’s image of the utopian aesthetic is colored by his insis-
tence that it is best expressed within (Western) sf. Considering that the genre 
(through Heinlein, Huxley, Pohl, Dick, Gibson, Bacigalupi, to name a few) 
possesses a strong strikingly dystopian tradition, the utopian aesthetic, what 
Jameson refers to as a “remedy,” must “first be a fundamentally negative one, 
and stand as a clarion call to remove and extirpate” (Archaeologies 12) the 
repressive ideologies of the capitalist state. 
 Nevertheless, this is only a part (albeit an important one) of the pro-
gressive character of a utopian aesthetic. While it is pivotal that dominant 
ideology be “frozen” through a cognitive map and its “gaps” pried open, this 
primarily deconstructive approach is not progressive per se: it demystifies with 
the intent to remove, but does not instill a new subjectivity in the individual. 
It is primarily deconstructive rather than creative. It exhausts the ideological 
space via extrapolated “future” landscapes without implementing new, radical 
subjectivities. Rupturing dominant ideology’s organic totality is not enough. 
While it is an important step, if we consider Althusser’s position that ideol-
ogy mediates between reality and the individual subject, then demystification 
or deconstruction is somewhat sterile: a new subjectivity requires a degree of 
replacement, a form of re-imagining. Indeed, Johnson suggests that any eman-
cipatory success relies on a correlation between artistic expression and the 
“recipient’s own felt dissatisfaction” (5). 
 Jameson’s rhetoric here is florid and active: utopia is a “clarion call” to 
“remove,” “extirpate,” and “remedy.” Implied is a new perspective beyond 
critical negativity: it denotes activism. In this regard, the merit of any uto-
pian text should be found in its generative potential: utopian representation 
should ultimately be transformative, seeking to modify, correct, and/or replace 
fundamentally oppressive systems (Archaeologies xv). Simply, there exist in 
Jameson’s utopian aesthetic the tools needed to dissect ideology, combined 
with a forward-looking vision. At the moment of anticipation—the creation 
and appropriation of a militantly progressive subjectivity—literary representa-
tion can lead to political praxis. As Johnson summarizes, this is the point of 
a progressive literature: a site that “presents not merely an alternative stand-
point but specifically acts to effect a change in the recipient’s consciousness” 
(1). Effect a change is the key, for, as Andrew Milner suggests, “the whole point 
of utopia or dystopia is to acquire some positive or negative leverage on the 
present” (“Utopia” 221). It is an active program geared towards some form of 
praxis. 
 In an interview for Gothic Studies, China Miéville suggested that Jameson 
had been blinded by “the overwhelming tsunami of post-Tolkien fantasy—
what’s sometimes called EFP: Extruded Fantasy Product—and taken it as a 
definitional to form” (63). Of course, the same argument (an argument Jame-
son himself acknowledges) can be thrown at mass-market sf. The problem 
then, is one of quality. Be that as it may, the most strident criticism of fantasy, 
outlined in Darko Suvin’s Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, is based on cogni-
tion: fantasy does not map material and historical realities, it ignores them. 
 For Suvin and Jameson, sf cognitively maps social totality. They argue 
that, via extrapolation (including not only advanced technology and shad-
owy organizations bent on world domination but also intergalactic conflict 
and post-apocalyptic landscapes), sf maps the present and estranges it, mak-
ing visible the repressive, destructive nature of dominant ideology. Where 
sf is generally argued to be a representation of the socio-historical totality, 
fantasy, with its ubiquitous secondary worlds, magic, and archaic temporal 
settings, appears as a denial, at the very least a dodge, of that same totality: 
hence fantasy is non-cognitive. The inference is that sf holds a monopoly on 
cognitive representation and is therefore the only site for utopian expression. 
Put another way, for Suvin and Jameson, only sf operates with “a totalizing 
perspective . . . able to recognize the falsity of the representation of reality 
which appears at the surface of society” (Johnson 26). What then, according 
to this logic, does fantasy actually do? Suvin readily denigrates fantasy as a 
“tool of the reigning ideology” (“Sense” 234). Fantasy becomes just another 
“surface” to be overcome, seen through, and shattered: it is false consciousness 
masking the true, repressive nature of reality. 
 Brian Attebery suggests that all fantasy “begins with a problem and ends 
with resolution. Death, despair, horror and betrayal may enter into fantasy, 
but they must not be the final word” (Strategies 15). This inherently “happily 
ever after” understanding underscores Suvin’s pejorative reading where fan-
tasy is considered affirmative in a Marcusian sense: an obfuscatory vessel of 
and for ruling ideology. However, paraphrasing José Monleón, Miéville puts 
forward the idea that fantasy should be “understood as a genre of modernity 
that is formed at the same point that (indeed as part of the process by which) 
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(proto-) sf is formed” (“Gothic” 62). Here, as both writer and theoretician, 
Miéville is able, historically, to place fantasy and sf, not in opposition, but 
alignment. Nevertheless, the initial insertion of the “fantastic moment” where 
the impossible is possible, is the “starting point of radical alienation from actu-
ality . . . that both ‘sf’ and ‘fantasy’ share” (“Gothic” 64). Whatever connota-
tive qualifications are attached to the impossible are irrelevant: the impossible 
is always culturally illuminating. 
 Manipulation, propaganda, persuasion, argument—call it what you will, 
fantasy and sf, like any literature, is always “something done with language by 
someone to someone” (Miéville, “Cognition” 235). That fantasy and sf make use 
of the unreal and impossible should not undermine the integrity or urgency 
of the images they produce. Most importantly, they treat their impossibili-
ties, strangeness, and dislocation with the utmost seriousness: what the text 
encounters, intersects, interprets, and desires to alter is reality. It is only by 
contemplating the impossible, by journeying into utopian/dystopian alter-
ity, that the limits of our imagination can be found and the impossible enter 
dialogue with possible. By juxtaposing the unreal with the real fantasy can 
familiarize former and defamiliarize the latter, changing both categories and 
offering new perspectives on what is possible that can ferment in the reader 
and lead to alternate subjectivities. Attebery talks about a kind of “resistance” 
in fantasy that allows it to shrug off attempts at orthodoxy. He claims that 
it “denies what everybody knows to be the truth. And, if you’re lucky, the 
untruth shall make you free” (“Politics” 25). 
Reflections of Reality
How could we not see this approaching? What trick of topography is this, that lets 
the sprawling monster hide behind corners to leap out at the traveller?
 It is too late to flee.
—China Miéville, Perdido Street Station
For Miéville, fantasy begins with reality—a subjective reality predicated upon 
fetishized relationships to commodities and the reification of daily life. This 
is, understandably, a mode readily able to critique capitalist reality where real 
life “is a fantasy” (“Editorial” 42). If “reality” is an irrational, social, subjective 
construct, then realism can only be a depiction of this absurdity. What, then, 
is fantasy? Is it better able to depict and resonate with real relations? Miéville 
posits that the fantasy is a viable alternative to realism for the modern world: 
“Fantasy is a mode that, in constructing an internally coherent but actually 
impossible totality—constructed on the basis that the impossible is, for this 
work, true—mimics the ‘absurdity’ of capitalist modernity” (“Editorial” 42). 
This act of reflection is vital for framing the fantasy’s critical importance. As a 
form intrinsically linked to world-creation, fantasy will inevitably—to varying 
degrees—demonstrate the ways reality is constructed and related to through 
subjectivity. In other words, by mimicking the absurdity of capitalist moder-
nity, fantasy transposes reality as category; if the reality of capitalist modernity 
is subjective, then fantasy’s representation of the impossible can be something 
of critical value. Fantasy does not escape reality but exposes, subverts, and 
creates it.
 Attebery, sharing a similar sentiment, feels that without a mimetic ele-
ment fantasy “would be a purely artificial invention, without recognizable 
objects or actions” (Strategies 3). Like all literature, fantasy is a response to 
context: the material, historical, social, political reality of the author. There 
is no creative vacuum. Attebery’s assertion dispels any notion of regressive 
escapism. But escapism is not the problem, not really, not anymore. 
 Moving away from such divisive arguments, the issue is function. If fantasy 
is purely, even predominantly, mimetic it faces great obstacles in expressing 
any progressive content. As this article will discuss, mimesis (mapping) is 
not enough to effect the creation of an opposing subjectivity. It shows what 
is there, not what can or should be there. Be that as it may, Miéville (as a 
theorist) makes an argument (both critically and creatively) that fantasy 
(especially his own) is a cognitive literature. Consequently, Miéville fulfills 
his own prophecy: “At the same sociological level at which SF and fantasy 
continue to be distinguished, the boundaries between them also—if anything 
at an accelerating rate—continue to erode” (“Cognition” 245).
 Perdido Street Station may be read as an insertion of Lukács into fantasy: a 
disturbing, totalized reflection of the capitalist society. A fully realized second-
ary world, Perdido Street Station is also, arguably, allegorically symbolic; that is, 
while not an explicit allegory, the text is permeated by several artistic repre-
sentations that are explicitly political symbols.4 Miéville’s aim is the complete 
construction of a “bad” reality, a distilled expression of false consciousness. 
Reflecting the commodity fetishism, vampiric capitalism, authoritarian legal-
ity, and social alienation of Western civilization, the city of New Crobuzon 
appears dark, oppressive, and monstrous. Johnson spells out this strategy: 
“Lukács’ core thesis is that only a totalizing perspective which draws essence 
and appearance into a unity is able to recognize the falsity of the representa-
tion of reality which appears at the surface of society” (26). As the narrative 
progresses it becomes increasing apparent that the “story” is an explicit, 
political, “warning.” The distinction is subtle but vital: the theoretical design 
is clear. This is not to suggest that such engineering detracts from the narra-
tive, only that it directs the reader into very specific conceptual space. What 
becomes starkly evident through this methodological focus is that Perdido 
Street Station, regardless of what else it achieves, highlights fantasy’s ability 
to represent ideological content in visible, meaningful, and critical ways. In 
slightly different terms, the city (New Crobuzon) and its denizens are rendered 
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in such a way as to appear singularly complete: a symbolic allegory of a capital-
ist metropolis. 
 New Crobuzon is “this great wen . . . a conspiracy of industry and violence, 
steeped in history and battened-down power, this badland beyond my ken” 
(Perdido 5). This imagery is constantly repeated. Dankness, darkness, erosion, 
effluence, and grime are continuously used to convey a particular, disquieting 
“mood” that pervades the entire text. Jameson rightly contends that “the aes-
thetic is no longer a secondary hobby but rather goes behind creation to iden-
tify the very sources of reality as such” (Archaeologies 44). Miéville’s “mood” 
speaks very strongly of an underlying discontent, an implicit decay, within the 
capitalist system; New Crobuzon is virtually anthropomorphized, alienating it 
from the characters, making it strange, and alien. By using a specific concep-
tual vocabulary the author’s perceived reality is “reflected” into the fantasy 
text as reality actualized. 
 Language dictates emotional reception and guides the reader’s contem-
plation of the dark, twisting alleys and filthy ghettos, the city’s toxic river, 
crumbling masonry, rampant crime, suborned justice, and brutally ruthless 
authority. The city is made the most visceral of monsters, nothing less than 
a malignant edifice, explicitly dangerous and alien to the individual. In “The 
Conspiracy of Architecture,” Miéville discusses the ways in which capital-
ism has produced an “aesthetic response to the peculiar alienated relation 
between humanity and architecture” (2). Most notably this response has been 
rendered in works of Gothic horror: tales of architecture with apparent life 
and, if not consciousness, then some form of affecting presence. Miéville’s own 
work echoes the idea, albeit with an exaggerated, fantastical sensibility: “Five 
enormous brick mouths gaped to swallow each of the city’s tramlines. The 
tracks unrolled on the arches like huge tongues. Shops and torture chambers 
and workshops and offices and empty spaces all stuffed the fat belly of the 
building . . .” (Perdido 79). This description of the titular station is indicative 
of Miéville’s portrayal of the city as a whole. There is something gluttonous 
and ravenous, animal and foreboding, about the buildings. They devour and 
disgorge, and, through this juxtaposition of the monstrous and metropolitan, 
Miéville creates an image opposing a mass-cultural norm. The city is not 
security, not opportunity: it alienates and is alienated from its populace. It is 
oppressive and disgusting, continually likened to a rapacious beast, filled with 
beings that do not, and cannot, understand one another; Miéville constructs 
a viciously grim, aggressively violent portrait of capitalist society. Using this 
reflective practice, the author’s reality is fantastically distorted to effect a 
startling response: modern capitalism becomes an all-encompassing monster 
where everything, as Lukács supposed, is “distorted by its commodity charac-
ter” (93).
 Creatures like the Construct Council and the slake-moths, though poten-
tially wonderful things in their own right, are intrinsically linked to the cor-
ruption of humanity, the apathy of society, and the barbarism of civilization. 
They are society’s avatars; a direct commentary on decadence, highlighting 
and enforcing the overarching mood. The Construct Council, a sprawling 
artificial intelligence built from discarded machines, is a novum expressing 
mechanization and rampant, technological consumerism. Furthermore, the 
Council’s relation to humanity is shockingly and casually violent. It is calcu-
lating and parasitic, using a human “mouthpiece” that recalls a gory zombie 
tradition: “His skull had been sheered cleanly in two just above the eyes. The 
top was completely gone. There was a little fringe of congealed blood below 
the cut. From the wet hollow inside the man’s head snaked a twisting cable, 
two fingers thick” (Perdido 549). The Council has invaded and supplanted the 
man’s mind, transforming all that was conscious and alive into a mechanical 
function. Dredging up images of lobotomy and rape, the man is an unthinking 
object used by the Council to further its own ends. 
 Worshipped, the Council manifests as a deity and its senses, its power, 
and its consciousness spread into the city as its “cables grow longer and reach 
further” (Perdido 761). There is something cancerous here; a systemic growth 
inveigling its way into the city like a tumor. Irrevocably tethered to New Cro-
buzon, the Council’s willingness to objectify individuals, its callous, cold logic, 
and its easy violence are synonymous with both the criminal element and the 
governing body controlling the city. 
 Interestingly, Lukács describes the fundamental capitalist drive as one of 
continuous, economic reproduction where “the structure of reification pro-
gressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into the con-
sciousness of man” (93). Symbolically, the Council is the calculating, inhuman 
face of capitalist ideology that permeates society and transforms individuals 
into mindless objects to be used, destroyed, and discarded. 
 Where the Council is dehumanized computation, the slake-moths, 
unleashed by bureaucratic greed, are the predatory nature of self-interest. 
Steve Shaviro summarizes that the moths are “capitalism with an (appropri-
ately) inhuman face. They are literally unthinkable; yet at the same time, they 
are immanent to the society that they ravage” (288). Conglomerates of insect, 
human, and cephalopod, the slake-moths, while “unthinkable,” are always in 
a process of representation. 
He could not see its shape. Only its dark, glistening skin and hands that 
clutched like a child’s. Cold shadows. Eyes that were not eyes. Organic folds 
and jags and twists like rats’ tails that shuddered and twitched as if newly 
dead. (Perdido 308) 
The slake-moths are quintessential Lovecraftian horrors that portray the 
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terrifying aspect of the capitalism’s unreal yet true nature. Indeed, the por-
trayal of the strange, dark, twisted, and invisible forces of the unseen, is an 
example of how fantasy is able to bring to light “all that is hidden, secreted, 
obscured . . . [and] to dis-cover, reveal, expose areas normally kept out of 
sight” (Jackson 65). By allowing for the impossible, by exposing the invisible 
and obscured, fantasy (in Miéville’s example) takes repressed material and re-
inscribes it as weird, nightmarish, and distorted: it transforms the “everyday” 
familiar into the disturbing unfamiliar (Jackson 65).
 Drinking dreams, the “slake-moths are alien beings, creatures of sheer 
excess” embodying “the depredations of an inhuman vampire-capital” (Sha-
viro 287). Effectively, Miéville is suggesting that New Crobuzon’s unconscious 
content is unnecessary—symbolically, “vampire-capital” feeds on a very impor-
tant part of what makes us human. Not surprisingly, those who have been fed 
upon are literally drained of humanity: they become mindless zombies. While 
Shaviro’s descriptions are apt they are a little one-dimensional. Granted, the 
slake-moths (and the Construct Council) embody “inhuman vampire-capital,” 
but they are only exaggerated ciphers, focused analogues of New Crobuzon’s 
social conscience. They are extrapolations of the city’s avarice, fear, and greed. 
Completely misunderstood by the state, the slake-moths are smuggled into 
gangland and used to create narcotics from digested dream material (literally 
stolen, imbibed dreams that are digested and defecated). Inevitably they break 
loose in a storm of terror and death. Becoming the locus of the narrative’s 
“evil,” it is easy to read these allegorical creations as Miéville’s sole, theoreti-
cal concern. However, it is the transformative powers of the city itself that are 
truly disturbing. 
 In many ways, the true indictment expressed in Perdido Street Station is the 
extent to which individual characters are molded to echo the twisted subjec-
tivity of the Council and the moths, becoming microcosms of the city itself. 
While monsters and aliens can be read as representations of animalistic greed 
or mechanistic logic, the text’s protagonists see themselves becoming monstrous 
as they are forced into terrible choices. To defeat the slake-moths, they abduct 
an old, sick man with the intention of killing him: “He had begun to cry 
halfway up. Derkhan had watched him and nudged him with the pistol, had 
felt her emotions from very far away. She kept distant from her own horror” 
(Perdido 720). In effect, Derkhan is alienated from herself, distancing action 
from emotion, by the city’s external influence: when everything is measured 
in terms of objects and cost, you must destroy a life in order to save others. As 
such a sacrifice, the old man is strapped to a jury-rigged, electrical generator, 
turned into a conduit to attract the moths, and has his brain burnt out. Objec-
tively, this action is monstrous even though it saves the greater population. 
However, this sequence demonstrates that, within the text’s capitalist logic, 
the ends justify the means. That the characters recognize the “evil” of their 
actions yet remain unable to act differently illustrates how the city’s ideology 
configures their relationship to society: lives are expendable. 
 Lukács might suggest that individual’s fate “is typical of society as a whole 
in that this self-objectification, this transformation of a human function into 
a commodity reveals in all its starkness the dehumanized and dehumanizing 
function of the commodity relation” (92). Interestingly, the characters fight 
the avatars of their own predatory society to save New Crobuzon, returning it 
to the status quo. Miéville voices disquieting insight and blatant dissatisfac-
tion, but offers no alternative. A new subjectivity is not achieved. 
I turn away from him and step into the vastness of New Crobuzon, this tower-
ing edifice of architecture and history, this complexitude of money and slum, this 
profane steam-powered god. I turn and walk into the city my home, not bird or 
garuda, not miserable crossbreed. I turn and walk into my home, the city, a man. 
(Perdido 867)
Johnson states that cognitively mapping social totality to create a literary 
reflection that brings together essence and appearance “allows the recipient 
to recognize his/her own species character” (75). New Crobuzon transforms 
individuals, alienates them from their fellow citizens, and shapes them into 
reflections of its own dark, rotting, gruesome, distorted, yet shockingly recog-
nizable metropolis. This is, perhaps, the first step in producing a progressive 
subjectivity in the reader. Transposing capitalist reality onto the dark, oppres-
sive streets of New Crobuzon reveals how monstrous the urban everyday has 
become or is becoming. Recognition sparks shock, then dissatisfaction, and 
from dissatisfaction the desire to change, to build a better, progressive reality. 
But in the end, Perdido Street Station seems to stop at dissatisfaction, offering 
no alternatives, suggesting acceptance, not action.5 If it instills a revolution-
ary subjectivity, it is blind, lashing out in anger to tear down and destroy. A 
progressive literature is capable of more.
When Fantasy Goes Through the Looking Glass
Suvin asks: “Is Fantasy as a tradition and present institution a tool of the reign-
ing ideology of wars for profit, locking out cognition . . . or is it an induction of 
cognition, however partial and metaphoric?” (“Sense” 234). But we must ask 
ourselves: is cognition the only measure for a progressive literature? Jameson 
and Suvin hypothesize that cognition is the fundamental tool required to build 
critical sf and is, therefore, the aesthetic basis to judge fantasy. 
 For the most part, Miéville’s fiction and theory trend towards a norma-
tive function; the artwork protests contemporary society, expressing a desire 
for a “better” reality. Perdido Street Station is directed towards an enlightening 
function wherein “the artwork provides a better and more convincing repre-
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sentation of reality than the perspective he/she has acquired from daily life” 
(Johnson 1–2). It shows a truth, a dark, disturbing truth, in totality. Using 
fantasy’s inherent dislocation, Miéville translates his extra-textual reality into 
the rot and slime of New Crobuzon; he takes the everyday and demonstrates 
how strange, how dangerous it actually is. That Perdido Street Station fails to 
produce an alternative subjectivity opposed to hegemonic ideology hints at the 
difficulty of creating progressive literature in a fetishized reality. Furthermore, 
it suggests an inability of totalizing reflections to engender political praxis 
beyond general discontent. 
 The secondary worlds of fantasy (and sf) portray radical extensions, 
extrapolations, dislocations and breaks from the real, implying dissatisfac-
tion with realistic representations of daily life. However, while fantasy may 
meditate on radical difference (social, historical, political, economic, sexual), 
it remains to be argued whether this difference (understood in a Lukácsian 
perspective) posits a “better” representation of reality.
 Fantasy is very deliberate in its use of space: the secondary world. Gen-
erally, this is a place (world, country, city) divorced temporally, historically, 
materially, and/or metaphysically from the extratextual world. Such displace-
ment is disarmingly simple yet allows for complex ramifications. Bould sug-
gests:
Fantasy fiction, in both its broad and narrow senses, draws upon this force, 
this continual location and dislocation. Where fantasy differs from the other 
forms of fiction is in the particular nature of its world-building. All fiction 
builds worlds which are not true to the extratextual world (itself an ideologi-
cal—and, arguably, therefore a fantastic—construct), but fantasy worlds are 
constructed upon a mere elaborate predicate: they are not only not true to 
the extratextual world but, by definition, do not seek or pretend to be. (81)
Superficially, creating secondary worlds merits the escapist label. The term has 
been used pejoratively: escaping is ignoring; impossibility equals impractically. 
However, it is only through discussions of impossibility that fantasy can inves-
tigate limits (of reality, of language, etc.) and undermine dominant ideological 
structures. By breaking with the real, the possible, fantasy can go beyond and 
address subjectivity from differing perspectives. 
 Particularly interesting are those metafictional texts concerned with how 
stories are told and read. In Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion, Rosemary 
Jackson states: “By foregrounding its own signifying practice, the fantastic 
begins to betray its version of the ‘real’ as a relative one, which can only 
deform and transform experience, so the ‘real’ is exposed as a category, as 
something articulated by and constructed through the literary or artistic text” 
(84). 
 Gene Wolfe’s Shadow of the Torturer attacks the unity of character and the 
objectivity of reality. Wolfe’s use of the first-person is deliberate, creating not 
only a powerful voice, but forcing the reader to question all representation. 
Severian (the narrator) mentions that it is “my nature, my joy and my curse, 
to forget nothing” (11); that he believes himself insane; and that there is a 
distinct possibility that “those memories were no more than my own dreams” 
(27). Consider further that Severian, when “writing” his tale, is the ruler of 
the Earth. The reader is being manipulated. Is Severian’s reality a lie? A false 
consciousness? The text is implicitly unreliable. As Attebery rightly states, this 
“conditional” understanding is something inherent to fantasy at its best where 
“reality is a social contract, easily voided; that the individual character is a 
conditional thing, subject to unnerving transformations into trees and axolotls 
and cockroaches and disembodied discourses” (“Politics” 24).
 Inherently post-structural, Shadow of the Torturer opens up, fragments, 
and ruptures unity. Directly addressing the reader, Wolfe assures that the text 
is a translation—many of its words are “twentieth-century equivalents,” are 
“suggestive rather than definitive” or “not strictly correct” (211). What is read 
is not what was written, and genre fantasy’s traditionally realistic, objectively 
presented representation (of solid, secondary worlds) is made subjective, shift-
ing, and unreachable. Jackson might argue that this is the first step in undoing 
“those unifying structures and significations upon which social order depends, 
[that] fantasy functions to subvert and undermine cultural stability” (70). 
 There is no reality beyond Severian’s perceptions and manipulations; what 
readers witness, what they know, is only what Severian knows or has chosen to 
tell. Combined with the claims of the appendix, itself a part of the narrative’s 
metafictional apparatus, that the narrative is Wolfe’s translation of a text that 
our language cannot truly comprehend, there is a distinct flavor of unending 
signifying chains—an inability to completely access the world of The Shadow of 
the Torture. Wolfe seems driven to express fantasy’s “attempt to remain ‘open’, 
dissatisfied, endlessly desiring . . . [where it is] most uncompromising in its 
interrogation of the ‘nature’ of the ‘real’” (Jackson 9).
 Ultimately, what is real is what we perceive, and what we perceive is fil-
tered by subjectivity. Wolfe plays games. The reader’s perception of Shadow of 
the Torturer is Severian’s: there are gaps, suspicions, paranoia, misunderstand-
ings, and omissions. Reality is textual, reality is relative. Furthermore, Seve-
rian (and therefore the reader) continuously encounter obstacles, characters, 
actions, that are seldom (at least immediately) understood.
 How are we to approach a text with hidden or held-back meanings? One 
way is to fill in the blanks with our knowledge of the conventions and tropes of 
genre fantasy. Severian is the orphan become king, the quintessential fantasy 
hero: on the surface the reader is confronted with heroic fantasy. However, 
this generic frame is positioned only to be eroded. Initially the reader fills out 
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the text as a bildungsroman because of Severian’s trajectory of learning a world 
of swords, guilds, and strange creatures. The text is shaped by expectations of 
how a fantasy traditionally works. This is the danger of unquestioned adher-
ence to the genre tag—the reader sees what they have been taught (by literary 
osmosis) to see. In other words, ideology works unconsciously on the subject, 
unrecognized and beyond conscious control. Wolfe acknowledges this (in the 
words of his narrator): “We believe that we invent symbols. The truth is that 
they invent us; we are their creatures, shaped by their hard, defining edges” 
(14). We are shaped by ideology. Wolfe’s metafictional strategy of departing 
from fantasy’s historical conventions inverts this relationship: it forces us to 
recognize what, as readers of fantasy, we have been taught to see. It is another 
instance of defamiliarization: a point of recognition that opens the way to 
effect changes in the social subject. If nothing is stable, solid, objective, or 
above suspicion then the individual must draw their own conclusions about 
reality. 
 Samuel Delany’s Tales of Nevèrÿon is similarly interested in the telling of 
tales. One of his narrators says: “And slowly, remembering all my listeners’ 
reactions, I began to pick pieces from my own ramblings that they seemed to 
recognize as true or accurate” (90). Literature always has a target, always has 
intent; language is always active, never passive. Johnson states that “ideologi-
cal conceptions have the general function of adapting people to their real con-
ditions of existence” (117). Ideology is not negative, but necessary. It becomes 
problematic when dominant ideology represses, oppresses, and dehumanizes 
individuals while simultaneously obscuring this very fact. The first step of a 
progressive fantasy should be to “dis-cover, reveal, expose areas normally kept 
out of sight” (Jackson 65). This is the idea that Delany contemplates in Tales 
of Nevèrÿon. 
 Ostensibly, the narrative follows two paths: Gorgik’s rise from slave to 
freeman to revolutionary and the childhood and trading life of Norema. These 
two strands, running in parallel and at times intersecting form the simple frame 
that allows Delany to expound on its political interests. Broken up into five 
sections, Tales of Nevèrÿon places at its heart the idea of story-telling. Indeed, 
the narrative seems aware that it is a careful fabrication, that it uses a sec-
ondary world for the purpose of understanding, criticizing, and re-imagining 
extra-textual reality. Gorgik’s time as a slave is rendered as a traditional tale 
of boy introduced to the world and becoming a man, while Norema’s upbring-
ing is marked by the stories of her wise-woman teacher Venn. Indeed, the 
text is bursting with stories being told, with lectures and parables and myths 
that sit one atop the other like a layer cake of subtle and self-reflexive uses of 
language. 
 Furthermore, the text’s temporality (in a pre-historical, quasi-African/
Persian land), further displaced and vaguer than the standard, medieval back-
drop, allows Delany to delve into the representation of language, empire, slav-
ery, sexuality at a moment these are being naturalized through ideology. This 
temporal gulf becomes the text’s primary fantastic, dislocation. There remains, 
however, a conduit between past and present whereby identified “patterns” of 
society (the use of slave labor, colonization, the transformative introduction 
of money, and the repression of sexual desire for social security) are portrayed 
and explored, affirming that “there is no just way in which the past can be 
quarantined from the present” (Said 2). 
 This is where the progressive nature of Tales of Nevèrÿon is manifest. The 
text becomes a site where the deconstruction of dominant ideological struc-
tures through their pre-historical relocation is aligned with counter-hegemonic 
representations of homosexuality, matriarchal societies, and revolution aimed 
at liberation. It is at this nexus that fantasy (in this mode) can become a bridge 
where “the orientation of the past tends toward an orientation on the future” 
(Marcuse 19).
 In “The Tale of Old Venn,” Venn relates a story addressing how language 
has become a thing of difference, not inclusion in civilization. Detailing a 
primitive society’s (the Rulvyn) adoption of money, Venn expounds on the 
differences between the empire’s colonial capitalism and the Rulvyn’s primal 
commune. One of the most obvious differences appears in the treatment of 
gender. Venn claims: “We say ‘vagina’ or ‘penis’ for a man’s and woman’s 
genitals, while the Rulvyn say ‘gorgi’ for both, for which ‘male’ and ‘female’ are 
just two different properties that a gorgi can exhibit—and believe me it makes 
all the difference!” (124). Here, the rational, scientific terms create a dualism 
that—throughout the narrative—forces value judgments (in this case, man 
over woman). Consequently, Delany’s “civilized people” have built their eco-
nomic base upon slavery6 and their ideology on colonization: the ruling empire 
brings civilization and freedom to the barbarians via economic structures. This 
freedom does not correspond with slavery’s dehumanization, and the reality of 
Tales of Nevèrÿon is one predicated on creating and enforcing difference which 
breeds anguish, violence, and dissent. 
 At the text’s conclusion, Gorgik and his homosexual lover, Small Sarg, are 
leading a revolution. Informed by his slavery in the empire’s mines, Gorgik is 
transformed into an emancipatory figure and his slave revolt steeps the nar-
rative in blood. We may suggest that this visceral un-covering of violence is, 
in itself, a transgressive act. The direct and concrete violence in this (in any) 
fantasy can draw focus to the invisible, ideological violence perpetrated on the 
individual by society. Storming a castle, Small Sarg massacres a series of guards 
in order to free slaves and a self-imprisoned, tortured Gorgik. What fantasy 
accomplishes, via the immediacy of its (predominantly) hand-to hand conflict, 
is the exposure of the barbarism that simmers just under the surface of what a 
matriarchal outsider (the warrior Raven) understands as that “rough, brutal, 
inhuman place they called civilization” (Delany 143). Raven’s worldview is 
indicative of the text’s series of reflective strategies. Tales of Nevèrÿon typically 
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expresses the desire for something excluded—an “opposition to the capital-
ist and patriarchal order which has been dominant in Western society over 
the last two centuries” (Jackson 176)—by bringing in its complete opposite. 
Aboard a ship whose crew is dominated by men, Raven is the outsider looking 
in. “You people, here in the land of death, you really are crazy, yes?” (Delany 
154), she remarks, and her comment is more than idle rhetoric. What follows 
is her account of a radically different creation myth that sees humanity cat-
egorically unified as Woman: Man is just a tortured, mutilated Woman pun-
ished for a misdeed. Besides pitting matriarchy against patriarchy, the woman’s 
revelations point at fantasy’s inherent ability to imagine extreme, new realities. 
What her comment about the “land of death” suggests (at least in her mind) 
is a diametrically opposed social existence: she is from a land ruled by women, 
a land of life, where men serve women and the female population serve in 
traditionally male roles (warriors, leaders, etc.). 
 Unsurprisingly, Raven’s myth is met with derision and unease by the ship’s 
male crew. Her own subjectivity seems too far removed from her colonial 
male listeners, too strange and uncomfortable. The same ideological violence 
Delany presumably protests in the extra-textual world is reversed and actual-
ized in the text: man is a beaten, destroyed woman forced into servitude by the 
matriarchy. Here Tales of Nevèrÿon is subtle. The point is not that the world of 
Man is wrong and the world of Woman right, but that ideological forces used 
to subjugate any individual are barbaric and disturbing. 
 It is only after this alternative worldview is expressed that the final story 
of the text appears and the central protagonists of the slave revolt re-inserted 
into narrative. Explaining their existence, Gorgik and his lover Small Sarg 
equate their sexuality to revolution.  
“We are lovers,” said Gorgik, “and for one of us the symbolic distinction 
between slave and master is necessary to desire’s consummation.”
“We are avengers who fight the institution of slavery wherever we find it,” 
said Small Sarg, “in whatever way we can, and for the both of us it is symbolic 
of our time in servitude and our bond to all men and women still so bound.” 
(Delany 239) 
Appropriating the symbol of their servitude, they identify themselves with 
their group and their class and so begin their emancipation. Gorgik acknowl-
edges that he is entrenched in dominant ideology; however, in the very next 
sentence, Small Sarg announces that that very acknowledgement—the con-
sciousness of their oppression—enables them to combat the forces that breed 
it. 
 Using its secondary world, the narrative lays a thin veneer over extra-
textual reality, retaining all its gaps and ridges while giving it new, shocking 
clothes. Where generic, post-Tolkienian “sword-and-sorcery” escapes, Tales 
of Nevèrÿon refuses all escape; it makes its world strange and disturbing to 
reorient the mind and demystify civilization. Delany displaces the present in a 
pre-historical past, juxtaposing the effects of contemporary ideology with capi-
talism’s revolutionary counter. By confronting the alienating effects of hege-
monic ideology, by investigating how such ideology works, Tales of Nevèrÿon 
opens up the reader to questioning daily life and how it is meditated. This is 
the transgressive, subversive, and eventually progressive power of fantasy; as a 
serious space that considers its reality seriously, it fully understands that “the 
less people take thought seriously, the more they think in conformity with 
what the State wants” (Deleuze and Guattari 44). Unsurprisingly, the Tales 
of Nevèrÿon, a narrative replete with the various ways humanity is enslaved 
(by money, by power, by language) concludes with the image of a dragon 
freed from its captivity as it soars into the night. This is the image of fantasy 
emancipated from the constrictions of convention and a fitting illustration of 
Delany’s revolutionary subject.
Where Dragons Fly
I see our global horizons as at best a struggle lasting for several generations against 
the amok runs of global capitalism with a bestial face that rapidly spreads hunger, 
wars, drugging, brainwashing, and prostitution, and at worst a descent into full 
super-technoscientific barbarism. 
—Darko Suvin, “Considering the Sense of ‘Fantasy’”
Suvin’s view may very well spark an artistic rupture, a backlash, the warning 
that rings alarm bells. Conversely, such a harsh reality could easily provoke 
the most idealistic or conservative escapism; the place where orphans become 
kings, war is glorious, and morality loses all shades of grey. In either case fan-
tasy is important as a symptom diagnosing affliction and as an imagining of 
potential curatives. 
 This thought should not be taken up as a banner for the disempowered. By 
its very nature, fantasy has been marginalized, its ruptures ignored and largely 
contained. Nevertheless, fantasy’s increasing popularity invites us to consider 
the potential for progressive (and an awareness of the conservative) content 
native to the genre. No longer providing only contemplation or interrogation, 
a truly progressive literature should seek to express its own impossible borders, 
model its own reality in its characters, and effect change in the reader’s sub-
jectivity. This change must take the form of emancipation of the individual 
from surplus repression, leading to a point where work becomes play and the 
individual is no longer alienated from the natural world and its inhabitants; 
a place where sexual desire can be expressed and gratified without the need 
for continuous sublimation. These are the radical human needs—true liberty, 
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equality, cooperation, gratification—that must be recalled and portrayed 
through utopian content.
 Jameson comments that “consumerism which, having become an end in 
itself, is transforming the daily life of the advanced countries in such a way as 
to suggest that the Utopianism of multiple desires and consumption is here 
already and needs no further supplement” (Valences 413). This psychological 
imprinting, insidious as it may sound, only highlights the need to demystify 
and replace fetishized consciousness. We must recognize that utopia is deeply 
ideological and understand the necessity of ideology itself. Only then can we 
argue for the necessity of a serious, progressive utopian literature, a utopian 
politics that transforms “ideology into an instrument of deliberate action on 
history” (Althusser, “Marxism” 232).
 Jameson’s utopian aesthetic focuses not on the future but on the present. 
It is an indictment of how far dominant ideology has shaped the individual 
and social consciousness. That sf does not portray the future but displaces 
the now raises a very interesting problem that speaks to the necessity for a 
militant subjectivity. Sf, perhaps conscious of its own discursive limitations, 
is a self-referential literature that brings the recipient to his/her imaginative 
limitations. 
[I]ts deepest vocation is over and over again to demonstrate and to dramatize 
our incapacity to imagine the future, to body forth, through apparently full 
representations which prove on closer inspection to be structurally and con-
stitutively impoverished, the atrophy of our time of what Marcuse has called 
the utopian imagination, the imagination of otherness and radical difference: 
to succeed by failure, and to serve as unwitting and even unwilling vehicles 
for meditation, which, setting forth for the unknown, finds itself transformed 
into a contemplation of our own absolute limits. (Archaeologies 288–89)
If this is the case, if utopia is method rather than goal, its function becomes 
the rallying cry. Once the limits of the fettered imagination are reached, once 
they have been recognized as constructions of ruling ideology, utopia becomes 
something that “can only be applied” (Metamorphoses 52) to the present, 
extrapolating from reality to portray dystopia. Such sf futures are seldom bright: 
they are warnings and acknowledgements of necessary change. Such change 
will be affective—a need to reclaim the full expression of human desire. Such 
Socialist Humanist subjectivity can only be realized by first understanding, 
deconstructing, and demystifying social totality and its constitutive ideological 
structures.
 By making visible reality’s dehumanizing aspects, its gaps and obstacles, sf 
becomes a locus for dissatisfaction. Society must change, and change for the 
better, because it is under the control of shadowy forces, in a constant state of 
war, approaching a fully mechanized, exploitative existence, where individu-
als are alienated from the world and from one another. Acknowledging this 
problem is the first step towards recovery. 
 When dystopian sf projects reality as a totality completely known, it 
removes the impossibilities and contradictions of existence and makes it bland. 
In contrast, according to Hume, fantasy “is not bodiless; like a living creature, 
it is affected by the limitations of the particular body it inhabits” (150). By 
opening itself up to utopian content, to progressive rather than reactionary 
visions, fantasy can do more than grow, it can evolve. Acknowledging its own 
impossibility—the very “fantasy of fantasy” (Bould 84)—fantasy becomes not 
un-real but, as Le Guin says, “surrealistic, superrealistic, a heightening of real-
ity” (84). It is dislocated, strange, improbable, fictional, shocking, intoxicating, 
laughable, impossible, alien, terrifying, but at all times true. Now more than 
ever this identifies fantasy’s importance. The impossible must appear before 
us magnificent and other, frightening and impossibly true. It must ask those 
questions that may never have answers but whose purpose is to make us stop, 
to make us think. That is why we have always needed and will always need 
dragons: sometimes to breathe their flames and burn us, sometimes to carry us 
on their wings so we can see our world anew. 
Notes
 1. Echoing Darko Suvin, Jameson limits his utopian aesthetics to dystopian sf 
which he understands as the combination of a cognitive map of the author’s social 
reality extrapolated into the alterity of possible, if not plausible, future settings. 
 2. Throughout, the term “ideology” refers to a series of representations geared 
towards mediating individuals with their social and material reality, and “subjectivity” 
to what is mediated through ideology. 
 3. Most notably, this canon includes the works by Philip. K. Dick (seventeen of 
which are referenced throughout Archaeologies), Swanwick, Le Guin, and Arkady and 
Boris Strugatsky.
 4. In this respect, Perdido Street Station is not alone; Miéville’s fantastic oeuvre 
follows similar patterns. From The Scar to The City and the City and Embassytown, the 
repeated concern is one of taking a concept of reality and reflecting it in a fantastic 
mirror. Although both The City and the City and Embassytown do this with an imagina-
tive scope seldom seen, only in Iron Council is this pattern skewed (but not broken) 
towards the realization of progressive, utopian content; but like the titular train, the 
goal remains ever visible, ever out of reach.
 5. This is true when Perdido Street Station is read on its own. However, when 
the milieu is expanded to include The Scar and Iron Council, a revolutionary air is 
noticeably generated. Indeed, this trilogy’s thematic trajectory, something beyond the 
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confines of this article, may very well be a powerful revolutionary aesthetic. 
 6. The fact that slavery begins giving way to a more advanced monetary, market 
system only emphasizes the way the past lives in the present, breathes into the future. 
However, the intricate relationship between the rise of a capitalist system and Gor-
gik’s slave revolt should not be overlooked. For an introduction to this discussion, see 
Freedman.  
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Abstract
This article argues that fantasy can be a progressive, discursively important, 
trangressive literature. To an extent, science fiction has historically been given 
greater theoretical validity over fantasy; however, writers like China Miéville, 
Samuel Delany, and Gene Wolfe offer compelling fantasy texts to counter 
this trend. Using Jameson as an anchor, this article navigates between Darko 
Suvin and Miéville, using Lukács to illustrate fantasy’s cognitive nature, before 
synthesizing an argument with Althusser, Rosemary Jackson, and Pauline 
Johnson suggesting the other ways (demystifying/deconstructive) fantastic fic-
tion can be read. Significantly, this article navigates and begins to close the 
historical, theoretical disparity between sf and fantasy, while suggesting that 
the cognitive evaluation of fantastic literature may be passing over much of 
what makes the tradition progressive. 
